COMMENTARY: A Preliminary Sampling of What is Not Red-Tagging (6th of 8 parts)

Read the 5th part

[7]   Excerpts from the Supreme Court Decision in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971), which upheld the August 21, 1971 Presidential Proclamation No. 889 announced August 23, 1971 on the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shortly after the August 21, 1971 Plaza Miranda Bombing

First Excerpt (at p. 477, citation omitted, underscoring supplied)

          In the language of the Report on Central Luzon submitted on September 4, 1971 by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven — copy of which Report was filed in these cases by the petitioners herein —

          “The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the Philippines) among the workers; the Malayang Samahan ng mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand of nationalism.” 

Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups, one of which — composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction — reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines early in 1969[1] and established a New People’s Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the “Protracted People’s War” or “War of National Liberation.”….  

Note that we have here not only a judicial decision but a legislative inquiry[2] report cited favorably as part of the findings of fact of the decision, particularly referring to what amount to front organizations (“infiltrate[d], influence[d] and utilize[d]) by/of the old PKP precursor of the new CPP, which would continue this modus operandi, as the next excerpt shows.  Surely, this is not red-tagging.

Second Excerpt (at pp. 484-85, underscoring supplied)

          Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that — as per said information and reports — the reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao’s concept of protracted people’s war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of the political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves; that conformably to such concept, the Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive and intensive program of subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the organization of armed city partisans and the infiltration in student groups, labor unions, and farmer and professional groups; that the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making Communist fronts of eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang Molave (SM) and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino (MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the KM had two hundred forty-five (245) operational chapters throughout the Philippines, of which seventy-three (73) were in the Greater Manila Area, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central Luzon, forty-two (42) in the Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party had recorded two hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured; that most of these actions were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front organizations; that the violent demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group of armed agitators; that the number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those of 1970; and that twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of fifteen (15) persons and the injury of many more.

Again, surely this judicial finding of fact is not red-tagging.

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[8]  Excerpts from Bonifacio H. Gillego, “Alliance with the Left: Desirable & Necessary,” Mr. & Ms., August 30, September 5, 1985, pp. 13-14

The late former Rep. “Ka Boni” Gillego of Sorsogon wrote this article as Director, Philippine Affairs of the U.S.-based Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP), part of the non-communist opposition to the Marcos martial law dictatorship.  The excerpts follow: (underscoring supplied)

          Their inherent strength stems from the synergistic combination of a disciplined cadre party (CPP), an army (NPA) and a political arm (NDF) capable of operating overtly and covertly among sectoral groups and mass organizations of their own creation or under their control.  The combination is unmatched by any or all existing non-political aggrupations combined in our country today.

xxx

          The premise of this proposal is that Philippine communism is not a closed system.  It can be tempered and restrained by forces and conditions that it confronts in the process of the struggle.  The tendencies that can be moderated are:

[1]  The “totalitarian temptation” inherent in communist practice and organizational structure.

[2]  The primary reliance on armed struggle in capturing political power.

[3]  The tendency to “direct the main blow” against non-communist leadership within an alliance.

[4]  The resort to deception in creating front organizations for tactical reasons.

            xxx

          Only a strong non-communist alliance can demand parity in representation and in policy-decision making from communist groups within the larger alliance.  Only on the basis of comparable organizational strength can they constitute a countervailing force within an alliance to prevent it from being a captive organization.  Even as it is presently constituted, the NDF is not homogenous in its attitude toward other political groups.  Non-alliance with elements of the NDF will only strengthen the leadership of the hardliners within the NDF and enhance their control of sectoral groups and mass organizations. 

Wise political insights in the course of an article advocating a political alliance by the non-communist opposition with the Left (i.e. the CPP-NPA-NDF) against the then common enemy Marcos dictatorship.  The article’s references to CPP front organizations cannot be considered red-tagging.  There is clearly no use of threats, no malicious purpose to impede constitutional rights and liberties, and no unfounded information.  But how much of the wise political insights in the whole 1985 classic Gillego article still holds true in the present Marcos Jr. political conjuncture 40 years hence? 

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SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. is a retired Judge of the RTC of Naga City, Camarines Sur, serving in the judiciary there from 2010 to 2022.  He has an A.B. in History cum laude from U.P. in 1975, a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Nueva Caceres (UNC) in Naga City in 1982, and a Master of Laws from the University of Melbourne in 2000.  He is a long-time human rights and international humanitarian lawyer; legislative consultant and legal scholar; peace advocate, researcher and writer; and author of a number of books, including on the Moro and Communist fronts of war and peace. Among his authored books are The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process (UP Press, 2001);  How do you solve a problem like the GRP-NDFP peace process? Part 2 (Sulong Peace, 2022); and his latest, Tigaon 1969: Untold Stories of the CPP-NPA, KM and SDK (Ateneo Press, 2023). He also has a trilogy of books on his court work and practice:  Justice of the Peace (2015), Drug Cases (2022), and Judicial Activist (2023), all published by Central Books, Inc., Quezon City.)

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[1]  This article author’s footnote correction:  Actually in January (not December 26) 1968, as noted in the Judge Magdoza-Malagar Resolution’s review of CPP history, at pp. 2, 25-26. 

[2]  1987 Const., Art. VI, Sec. 21 on congressional inquiries in aid of legislation,