PEACETALK | If UBJP is disqualified, the transition takes the hit

Many people are treating the UBJP accreditation fight as a technical election-law dispute. That reading is too narrow.

In BARMM, this is not just about party registration requirements. It is about the political phase of a peace settlement. The first parliamentary election is supposed to show that democratic competition can carry what armed conflict once carried. If the UBJP is removed from the field, many communities will not experience that as routine legal housekeeping. They will read it as a message about who is allowed to compete.

That perception is the risk. Legitimacy is the risk.

The first consequence is a trust rupture at the worst possible time. The first parliamentary poll is not an ordinary cycle. It is the public test of whether the post-CAB political order can absorb high-stakes competition without breaking. If UBJP is disqualified, legal reasoning may satisfy lawyers but still fail in the court of public meaning. People will ask a hard question: does the transition bargain apply when power is actually on the line?

Once that question settles in, confidence weakens beyond this case.

The second consequence is political hardening. Moderates who invested in democratic participation lose ground when participation appears conditional. Hardline voices gain space, not because they offer better programs, but because they can say the system was never fully open. This is how the center thins in fragile transitions: not with one dramatic rupture, but through repeated signals that restraint does not pay.

In practice, every next dispute becomes easier to ignite.

The third consequence is fragmentation in an already crowded political field. BARMM is already managing party formation, clan competition, and national-level influence. Excluding a major actor will not simplify that field. It can push alliances into grievance mode, turn legal process into campaign weaponry, and make post-election coalition-building harder. If coalition-building fails, governance slows. When governance slows, promised peace dividends are delayed again.

Ordinary citizens absorb the cost first.

The fourth consequence is a long-tail security risk. Disqualification does not automatically lead to violence. But it can strengthen recruitment narratives of spoilers and extremist actors who feed on stories of exclusion and betrayal. They do not need to invent grievance if trust is already fraying. In a region with unresolved historical wounds, legitimacy setbacks become security inputs over time.

This is why the case must be managed as a transition-risk event, not only as an election-law event.

What must happen if disqualification occurs?

First, COMELEC should release full legal reasoning quickly and clearly, including evidentiary standards and procedural chronology. Short statements might work in high-trust settings. This is not a high-trust setting.

Second, key political actors in BARMM and Manila should issue coordinated commitments to non-violence and democratic competition. Not generic calls for calm. Specific language rejecting retaliation, rumor escalation, and blanket delegitimization of the process.

Third, civic and religious leaders should activate confidence channels immediately after any ruling, especially in areas vulnerable to misinformation. Silence in the first 48 hours will be filled by political entrepreneurs.

Fourth, national government and transition stakeholders should protect broad participation in practice, not only in principle. If citizens conclude that entry points are narrowing, legal correctness alone will not prevent political estrangement.

The easiest mistake right now is to call this “just a case.” It is a stress test of whether the Bangsamoro transition can absorb legal conflict without political fracture.

If UBJP is disqualified, the legal process may close on schedule. The legitimacy effects will not.

The question is whether institutions and leaders will manage that reality before it becomes another chapter in the region’s long memory of broken promises.

(MindaViews is the opinion section of MindaNews. Camilo “Bong” Montesa of Cagayan de Oro is a lawyer and professor based in Pasig City. He has spent three decades in conflict and peacebuilding work in the Philippines.)